Abstract-For various services, OTP (One-Time Password) is increasingly employed to sign in services. The most popular OTP scheme is S/KEY. However, S/KEY scheme is vulnerable to hash collision. In order to solve this problem, Choi and Kim proposed an OTP scheme based on pairing operation. This scheme overcame hash collision problem. Unfortunately, the scheme is vulnerable against insider attack. In this paper, we propose insider attack-resistant OTP scheme based on pairing operation. Our scheme employed zero-knowledge proof to generate OTP values. In short, our scheme sends an OTP and two random numbers encoded with XOR; any adversary has no sense about the random numbers. Our scheme authenticates entities with an OTP and gain a hint on next OTP value from one of random numbers. Consequently, we present insider attack-resistant OTP scheme by eliminating shared parameter among insider (e.g. time stamp).
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, as increasing the concern about internet service, many researchers have focused on its security. Especially, services, which use password-based security, have been challenged to be broken by many attackers.
For example, most of internet users set identical passwords for more than two different web sites in static password mechanism. Therefore, there is high probability that a user's password is also valid for another web site. Due to this issue, if a password on a web service is revealed from specific attack (such as malware, eavesdropping, physical attack etc.), the adversary can disguise as the user on another web service.
For the reason, highly secured services (such as online banking, online shopping etc.) which are directly related to customers are required to be safe from this vulnerability. One of the solutions [1] - [6] is OTP (One-Time Password) [7] . Since OTP is valid for only one session, whenever session is changed, users shall sign in web services with different password; namely, the current password can be used only one time to log into the web service. In contrast, a fixed password can be used to sign in a web service consistently. Consequently, many important services recommend users to sign in with an OTP. Unfortunately, OTP schemes [8] - [17] failed to become popular. One of the reasons may be that the OTP requires independent token which generates an OTP.
The most popular OTP scheme is S/KEY [8] which is based on hash chain. The S/KEY scheme consists of registration phase and authentication phase. In registration phase, server generates hash chain of x selected by user. The length of hash chain is denoted as n , and the hash chain is valid for n -times; in other words, OTP based on S/KEY must update the hash chain after n -authentication. In authentication phase, the last hash value of n hash chain becomes the first OTP value.
However, S/KEY has vulnerability on hash function. In registration phase, hash collision may come up when hash chain is generated. In detail, collision in middle of hash chain makes two hash chains have same hash values after collision. From this collision, an adversary can easily predict the next OTP value.
For instance, assume that there are two users, Alice and Bob, using OTP based on S/KEY and an adversary, Eve. Eve gathers and stores all the used OTPs of Alice and Bob. From the collected OTP values, Eve tries to complete two hash chains of Alice and Bob. In this phase, we assume that Eve discovered that the end of hash value of Alice's hash chain and the front of hash value of Bob's hash chain is same; the first OTP value of Alice and the current OTP value of Bob is same. It has high probability that Alice's hash chain and Bob's hash chain have collision. From the examples above, we can easily recognize that the Alice's second OTP value becomes the next OTP value of Bob with high probability.
In order to overcome this problem, Choi and Kim [9] proposed pairing-based OTP scheme. This scheme has two advantages. One of advantages is that the scheme does not require an independent token to generate OTP; instead of the token, the scheme uses mobile device. The other advantage is that a collision have no influence on OTP in the scheme since it utilizes exponential of mobile personal identification number (MPIN) over finite field; although two numbers are same in current, two numbers can be different in future since each number after exponential operation can be different. However, since the scheme used only MPIN to generate next OTP value, it is vulnerable against insider attack.
A. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a new OTP scheme based on pairing operation. The scheme proposed by Choi and Kim [9] is vulnerable on masquerading by insider. In order to overcome the issue, we use a random number instead of MPIN; namely, OTP values are computed from exponential operation of a random number. Thereafter, users give the server a hint for next OTP whenever they log into web services. In order to announce the hint, we use zero-knowledge proof technology [18] , [19] . The main point of our construction is to prevent insider attack with providing the advantages of pairing operations [20] , [21] . Consequently, our scheme has two advantages. The first advantage is that the scheme is secure against insider attack. Our scheme employs a random exponential and zero-knowledge proof instead of exponential operation of MPIN. This employment makes the scheme secure against insider attack by eliminating shared parameter in authentication packet.
B. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, preliminary is presented. We review the related works on OTP on bilinear maps and define its problems in Section III. A new insider attack-resistant OTP scheme called Insider Attack-Resistant OTP (One-Time Password) Based on Bilinear Maps is proposed in Section IV and analyzed in Section V, Section VI and VII contains conclusions and acknowledgements respectively.
II. PRELIMINARY

A. Bilinear Maps
The pairing-based cryptography is on the basis of the bilinear map. Consider two groups 1  and 2  of prime
 is an additive group and 2  is a multiplicative group.
We denote two generators of 1  as P and Q , then for each element of 1  , we can write as follow:
The bilinear map ê is defined as follows:
Bilinear maps satisfy three properties: 
2) Non-degeneracy
It other expression,
If P is not an identity then ˆ( , ) e P P also generates to 2  which is not the identity. 
3) Computability
D. One-Time Password (OTP)
One-Time Password (OTP) is a password valid only for one login session which overcomes shortcomings of static password. By using a fresh password for every new login session, the OTP scheme is more secure than traditional passwords since it is safe from eavesdropping and replay attack.
There are two major methods for generating the OTP. One is a time-synchronized OTP and the other is on the basis of mathematical algorithm, especially hash chain.
1) The time-synchronized OTP
In time-synchronized OTP, current time is used for new password generation. One example of time-synchronized OTP is The Time-based One-time Password (TOPT) [10] , extension of HMAC-based OTP(HOTP) [11] , and is an IETF standard.
2) The mathematical algorithm based OTP In this kind of OTP, previous OTP is used for new OTP generation. S/KEY [8] is in this category of OTP. S/KEY, based on the Lamport [6] 's scheme, is proposed by N. Haller in 1995. In S/KEY system, user generates OTP through secure hash function [2] calculation and sends the OTP to server. Thereafter, the server verifies received OTP. For each use of OTP, the number of computation is reduced by one, therefore server can verify OTP by applying one more secure hash function computation on received OTP. We can divide the procedure into registration and authentication.
3) Registration phase
Step 1
User (U ) generates nonce x and sends it to server( S ).
Step 2 : ( ), n S U H x n  Server computes, stores and sends () n Hx and n to user. n is an initial value for certain limited number of hash computation. Registration phase uses secure channel.
4) Authentication phase
:
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Step 2 :' S verify OTP [9] proposed OTP based on pairing computation in 2012. The scheme has two phases like traditional S/KEY scheme and is as follows:
A. Registration Phase
User must register his/her mobile device to use mobile OTP. Registration phase uses secure channel.
Step 1 12 : , , , S U P q   Server ( S ) sends parameters of bilinear map (two groups 1  , 2  , generator P and prime q ) to user(U ).
Step 2 : ( , ) 
MPIN U U S e M R 
User computes ˆ( , )
B. Authentication Phase
Step OTP e OTP T  computation and MPIN is fixed value. This means that anyone who gets MPIN can make and predict new OTPs. For this reason, we suggest secure mobile OTP scheme which is strong against insider attack and hash collision problem.
IV. INSIDER ATTACK-RESISTANT OTP(ONE-TIME PASSWORD) BASED ON BILINEAR MAPS
In this section, we suggest insider attack-resistant mobile OTP (One-Time Password) based on bilinear maps. This scheme employs zero knowledge proof. Registration and authentication procedure is as follows:
A. Registration Phase
We assume that registration is performed over secure channel.
Step 2 : ( , ) ,
MPIN UU
U S e X R R

User computes ˆ( , )
MPIN UU e X R from user's secret key U X , nonce U R and mobile pin MPIN. Next, user sends computed value with nonce R to server. Server stores R .
Step 3 server's secret key S X . Next, server sends computed result with N to user. N is an initial value for certain limited number of hash computation. User stores N .
Step 4 Computer and Communication Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 3, May 2013 to server with H R for next ' R .
Step 
V. ANALYSIS
A. Masquerading Attack
Masquerading attack is that an adversary disguise as other users to log into services. This attack can be classified as insider attack and outsider attack. Choi and Kim [9] 's scheme is safe from masquerading attack by outsider. In the case of insider attack, however, their scheme allows an adversary disguise as a legal user. The key point of Choi and Kim [9] 's scheme is that the time stamp, which is shared among insider registered in the same server, was used to encode previous OTP. This property makes the scheme depends on the security of MPIN. However, MPIN does not have enough length since OTP is very short in general condition. To solve this problem, we employed random numbers instead of MPIN and time stamp; namely, OTP ( ' OTP ) was computed as In this paper, we proposed insider attack-resistant OTP scheme based on bilinear maps. In order to generate OTP, our scheme uses two random numbers instead of MPIN. The main idea is that OTP is computed by exponential operation of a random number. When users are authenticated by the server using OTP mechanism, users give the server a hint for next OTP; namely, the users and the server prepare to authenticate future sessions in given session. The hint is formed as exclusive-OR of two random numbers. In an aspect of an adversary, solving the hint is difficult as complexity of solving one-time pad cipher since he/she cannot verify whether the value is correct although correct random number is given. Consequently, our scheme prevents insider attack and can be widely used to enhance OTP authentication.
